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Honorifics in the Classroom
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In recent years, public universities have promulgated pronoun policies designed to encourage professors and students to respect the pronouns that others use
to identify themselves. A professor who does not follow the pronoun policy and instead misgenders a student—or uses gendered words or pronouns that do not match
that student’s gender identity—may be disciplined by their university for violating
the pronoun policy.
This Comment argues that professorial speech misgendering students in the
classroom should not be protected by a professor’s First Amendment right to academic freedom, which traditionally covers teaching and scholarship. The First
Amendment protects some exercises of academic freedom by public-university professors and public universities, but the bounds of these protections are not well defined. When a professor violates an official university pronoun policy by purposefully
misgendering a student as part of a classroom-management device, a conflict arises
between the professor’s individual academic freedom and the university’s institutional academic freedom. This Comment first seeks to situate this type of conflict
within the history of academic freedom and the judicial principles that the Supreme
Court and lower courts have used to discuss academic freedom. The Comment then
argues that courts evaluating a conflict between individual and institutional academic freedoms should rule in favor of whichever exercise of academic freedom ensures that students can fully access the content of the lecture. In the case of misgendering as classroom management, the professor’s exercise of academic freedom
harms the misgendered student and makes it difficult for that student to fully engage with the lecture, while the university’s exercise of academic freedom to promulgate a pronoun policy furthers a pedagogical environment in which all students can
equally access educational content. Thus, the university’s exercise of academic freedom should override the professor’s in this conflict.
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INTRODUCTION
Ms. Doe, a young transgender woman, had been living as female “in all aspects of her life for over five years.”1 She enrolled
as a student at Shawnee State University in Portsmouth, Ohio,
in spring 2017.2 One year later, she enrolled in a class taught by
Professor Nicholas Meriwether because she was interested in the
1
Jane Doe and Sexuality and Gender Acceptance’s Mot. to Intervene as Defendants
at 5, Meriwether v. Trustees of Shawnee State Univ., No. 18-CV-753 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 5,
2019), 2018 WL 9814058 [hereinafter Mot. to Intervene].
2
Id.

2022] Academic Freedom and Misgendered Honorifics in Classrooms 1559

topic—political philosophy.3 On the first day of the class,
Meriwether misgendered Ms. Doe, calling her a male honorific.4
After class, Ms. Doe informed him that she was a woman and
asked him to use female honorifics.5 Meriwether refused.6 He insisted on continuing to use male honorifics and pronouns for Ms.
Doe.7 Following his lead, her classmates occasionally copied
Meriwether’s incorrect use of male honorifics and pronouns.8
Feeling singled out and disrespected in class caused significant
psychological strain and distress for Ms. Doe.9 She “had regular
crying spells outside of class,” and her gender dysphoria increased
in both severity and duration.10 Unfortunately, Ms. Doe’s experience is not unique for people whose gender identity differs from
their sex assigned at birth.
Transgender11 people may identify with or express a gender
that differs from society’s expectations of the sex assigned to them
at birth.12 To reflect this expressed gender, which is called a gender identity,13 they may specify the pronouns that they and others
will use when referring to them.14 For example, a transgender person who identifies as a woman may ask people to refer to her using the pronouns “she” and “her.” Misgendering occurs when a

3

Id.
Id.
5
Id.
6
Mot. to Intervene, supra note 1, at 5.
7
Id.
8
Id. at 6.
9
Id.
10 Id.; see also Mayo Clinic Staff, Gender Dysphoria, MAYO CLINIC (Feb. 26, 2022),
https://perma.cc/CL4U-TD29 (“Gender dysphoria is the feeling of discomfort or distress
that might occur in people whose gender identity differs from their sex assigned at birth
or sex-related physical characteristics.”).
11 Throughout this Comment, I focus on the experience of those who identify as
transgender because Meriwether v. Hartop, 992 F.3d 492 (6th Cir. 2021), a case that this
Comment discusses in depth, concerned a transgender student. In reality, the harms that
come from misgendering do not affect only those who identify as transgender. The experiences of those who do not use the pronouns assigned at birth—including gender nonconforming, gender nonbinary, and asexual folks—would likely be encompassed in the
analysis. Essentially, the experience of misgendering can apply to many who are not cisgender. See Helana Darwin, Challenging the Cisgender/Transgender Binary: Nonbinary
People and the Transgender Label, 34 GENDER & SOC’Y 357, 369–73 (2020).
12 MATSON LAWRENCE & STEPHANIE MCKENDRY, SUPPORTING TRANSGENDER AND
NON-BINARY STUDENTS AND STAFF IN FURTHER AND HIGHER EDUCATION: PRACTICAL
ADVICE FOR COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES 18–20 (2019).
13 See id. at 18.
14 See id. at 21–23.
4
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transgender person is addressed with a word or pronoun that does
not accurately reflect their gender identity.15
The classroom setting creates unfortunate opportunities for
misgendering students, and misgendering a student can cause
tangible harm. A lack of respect for gender-identity choices can
negatively impact transgender students’ learning outcomes.16 For
example, transgender students face an increased risk of negative
academic outcomes.17 Beyond academics, misgendering makes
college students feel less like they are a part of their chosen community.18 Tragically, misgendering and gender-orientation harassment also leads to a higher risk of suicide among transgender
youth.19
To mitigate the harm caused by misgendering, many universities have sought to provide more inclusive environments for
transgender people by promulgating pronoun policies.20 These
pronoun policies allow students to choose to be addressed by the
pronouns that reflect their gender identities.21 Pronoun policies
15 LAURA WEISS ROBERTS, STUDENT MENTAL HEALTH: A GUIDE FOR PSYCHIATRISTS,
PSYCHOLOGISTS, AND LEADERS SERVING IN HIGHER EDUCATION 427 (2018); see also
LAWRENCE & MCKENDRY, supra note 12, at 25.
16 See, e.g., Jonathan T. Pryor, Out in the Classroom: Transgender Student Experiences at a Large Public University, 56 J. COLL. STUDENT DEV. 440, 451 (2015) (“Just anticipating . . . [being outed or misgendered in the classroom] created anxiety about what
[a particular student interview subject’s academic] experience may be like.”).
17 See id. at 445–53; Michael R. Woodford, Jessica Y. Joslin, Erich N. Pitcher & Kristen
A. Renn, A Mixed Methods Inquiry into Trans* Environmental Microaggressions on College Campuses: Experiences and Outcomes, 26 J. ETHNIC & CULTURAL DIVERSITY SOC.
WORK 95, 106–09 (2017); Rob S. Pusch, Objects of Curiosity: Transgender College Students’
Perceptions of the Reactions of Others, 3 J. GAY & LESBIAN ISSUES IN EDUC. 45, 51 (2008):

Coming out as transgender can become all-consuming, as the person tries to
come to terms with one’s identity. For Mary, this resulted in doing poorly in
school, forcing her to move back with her parents in a small town with no local
support, where she attends a nearby two-year college.
18 See Abbie E. Goldberg & Katherine A. Kuvalanka, Navigating Identity Development and Community Belonging When “There Are Only Two Boxes to Check”: An Exploratory Study of Nonbinary Trans College Students, 15 J. LGBT YOUTH 106, 108–09 (2018).
19 See Michael L. Hendricks & Rylan J. Testa, A Conceptual Framework for Clinical
Work with Transgender and Gender Nonconforming Clients: An Adaptation of the Minority
Stress Model, 43 PRO. PSYCH.: RSCH. & PRAC. 460, 463–64 (2012); see also Amaya
Perez-Brumer, Jack K. Day, Stephen T. Russell & Mark L. Hatzenbuehler, Prevalence and
Correlates of Suicidal Ideation Among Transgender Youth in California: Findings from a
Representative, Population-Based Sample of High School Students, 56 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD
& ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 739, 742–44 (2017).
20 See, e.g., Occidental College, Lived Name & Pronoun Policy, OXY.EDU,
https://perma.cc/2QDK-DBJV; Hampshire College, Preferred First Name and Pronoun
Policy, HAMPSHIRE.EDU.
21 See, e.g., NYU, Pronouns, NYU.EDU, https://perma.cc/9TC8-YK7C; Ohio University,
Preferred Pronouns Policy, OHIO.EDU, https://perma.cc/RH6Q-VDVV; Occidental College,
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can tangibly benefit students. For example, research has shown
that providing students with a structured way to notify their professors of their pronouns can reduce the pressure related to “coming out.”22 In addition, these policies benefit universities by reducing their litigation risk. Discrimination against transgender
students is illegal: Title IX23 prohibits schools from discriminating
against students on the basis of sex—which, as the Supreme
Court recognized in the context of interpreting Title VII24 in
Bostock v. Clayton County,25 can include discrimination on the basis of gender identity.26 Finally, pronoun policies provide guidance
to professors, helping them avoid conduct that may give rise to
allegations of discrimination from their students.
However, not all professors welcome this guidance. Some professors have objected to their universities’ pronoun policies. For
instance, Meriwether violated his university’s pronoun policy by
misgendering his student, Ms. Doe.27 In Meriwether v. Hartop,28
the Sixth Circuit evaluated Meriwether’s claim that his university’s decision to discipline him for this violation infringed on his
First Amendment29 right to academic freedom.30 He argued that
his use of gendered honorifics in the classroom as a classroommanagement device should be protected.31

supra note 20; Hampshire College, supra note 20. It’s not immediately clear on the face of
these policies whether faculty would be punished for not following the pronoun policies. In
the case of the professor who was punished in Meriwether, the pronoun policy was published and the faculty were separately informed that they were bound by the terms of the
pronoun policy and could be disciplined for transgressions. See Meriwether, 992 F.3d at 498.
22 See LAWRENCE & MCKENDRY, supra note 12, at 81–83.
23 Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 373
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1688).
24 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. 2000e–2000e-17 (2000)).
25 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
26 Id. at 1741; see also Enforcement of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972
with Respect to Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity in Light
of Bostock v. Clayton County, 86 Fed. Reg. 32,637, 32,638 (June 22, 2021) (interpreting the
Supreme Court’s decision in Bostock, which outlawed discrimination against transgender
employees as discrimination on the basis of sex under Title VII, to apply to students) [hereinafter Title IX in Light of Bostock].
27 Meriwether, 992 F.3d at 499–500.
28 992 F.3d 492 (6th Cir. 2021).
29 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
30 Meriwether, 992 F.3d at 503. The Sixth Circuit also considered whether the university had violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment by disciplining
Meriwether for not following the pronoun policy. Id. at 512. That topic is outside the scope
of this Comment.
31 See id. at 503.
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Meriwether’s violation came from instances in which he repeatedly misgendered Ms. Doe because he believed that gender
must always match the sex assigned at birth.32 As noted above,
Ms. Doe identified as female and asked Meriwether to use female
pronouns and honorifics when referring to her, in accordance with
her gender identity.33 Meriwether refused to use female pronouns
for Ms. Doe.34
Ms. Doe and university administrators asked Meriwether to
respect Ms. Doe’s pronouns. After the first misgendering incident,
Ms. Doe approached Meriwether to request that he use her female
pronouns.35 She then submitted a Title IX complaint.36 Following
Ms. Doe’s Title IX complaint, the dean approached Meriwether
about the misgendering.37 They settled on a compromise:
Meriwether would call all the other students by their gendered
honorifics but would refer to Ms. Doe only by her last name.38
After Ms. Doe complained twice more—once because she was dissatisfied with the compromise and once because he misgendered
her yet again—Meriwether offered an accommodation where he
would use Ms. Doe’s pronouns but with a disclaimer in his syllabus that he was doing so under “compulsion.”39 The university rejected this accommodation as violating the university’s pronoun
policy.40 After receiving another complaint from Ms. Doe because
of the “discriminatory mistreatment,”41 the university informed
Meriwether that he could either (1) cease using gendered honorifics when referring to students or (2) refer to Ms. Doe using feminine pronouns.42
Meriwether eventually received a warning letter threatening
future punishment if he continued to misgender Ms. Doe.43 Following an investigation, the Title IX office concluded that
Meriwether had engaged in discrimination and created a hostile
environment for Ms. Doe.44 Meriwether was then formally warned
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44

Id. at 501, 507.
Id. at 499.
Mot. to Intervene, supra note 1, at 5–6; see also Meriwether, 992 F.3d at 499–500.
Meriwether, 992 F.3d at 499.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 499–500.
Meriwether, 992 F.3d at 500.
Mot. to Intervene, supra note 1, at 6.
See Meriwether, 992 F.3d at 500.
Id. at 501.
See id. at 500–01.
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that if he did not change the way he addressed transgender students, he could be subject to further corrective action.45 After the
Shawnee State faculty union filed an internal grievance on
Meriwether’s behalf, a committee found that he had violated
Title IX by engaging in differential treatment and upheld his formal warning.46 Meriwether then filed a lawsuit asking for a declaratory judgment that the university’s pronoun policies violated
his First Amendment rights and an injunction prohibiting the
university from enforcing the pronoun policy against him because
he feared further punishment from the school.47 The district court
dismissed the lawsuit for failure to state a claim, and Meriwether
appealed the decision to the Sixth Circuit.48
The Sixth Circuit held that Meriwether’s use of misgendered
honorifics was protected under his First Amendment right to academic freedom, and the court reversed and remanded for further
proceedings.49 The Sixth Circuit’s decision cast a broad net: the
court held that a professor’s academic freedom “covers all classroom speech related to matters of public concern, whether that
speech is germane to the contents of the lecture or not.”50 This
decision was unique among other academic-freedom cases because of its broad protection of the professor’s academic freedom
in the classroom.51
Meriwether raises a broader question regarding pronoun policies and misgendering: When a professor defies their university’s
pronoun policy by misgendering a student in the classroom, does
this action fall under the professor’s First Amendment right to
academic freedom?
Among other things, the First Amendment protects the right
to freedom of speech from undue government intrusion.52 Academic freedom is an unsettled doctrine in First Amendment jurisprudence. The Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged that
45

Id. at 501.
See id. at 501–02.
47 See Meriwether, 2020 WL 704615, at *1.
48 Id. at *2.
49 Meriwether, 992 F.3d at 503, 518.
50 Id. at 507.
51 See, e.g., Piggee v. Carl Sandburg Coll., 464 F.3d 667, 672 (7th Cir. 2006) (noting
that, while professors have the right under their academic freedom to communicate controversial ideas in the classroom, they must stay within the university’s curriculum);
Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1071–77 (11th Cir. 1991) (“Dr. Bishop’s interest in academic freedom and free speech do not displace the University’s interest inside the
classroom.”).
52 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358–59 (2003).
46
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academic freedom is a “special concern of the First Amendment”
but has never decided a case solely on the basis of academic freedom.53 The Court has, however, indicated that both universities
and individual professors have First Amendment rights to academic freedom.54 The bounds of these freedoms are ill-defined,
particularly when the university’s academic freedom (its “institutional academic freedom”) and the professor’s academic freedom
(their “individual academic freedom”) are in conflict with each
other.55
The misgendering in Meriwether arose during the use of a
classroom-management device. The ultimate purpose of classroom management is to establish an environment where students
can engage in meaningful academic learning.56 This may involve
changing the structure of instruction or using group-management
methods.57 For example, Meriwether used gendered honorifics to
control the classroom discussion.58 Other examples of classroommanagement devices include the Socratic method, student-led
brainstorming,59 and classroom discipline.60
When a professor contravenes a university’s pronoun policy
through the use of misgendered honorifics as a classroommanagement device, that action puts individual and institutional
academic freedoms at odds. This situation implicates the university’s academic freedom to institute a pronoun policy and the professor’s academic freedom to control the form of the lecture.
53

Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
See, e.g., id.; Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003).
55 While this issue could presumably arise in the K-12 context, that is outside the
scope of this Comment. See William W. Van Alstyne, Academic Freedom and the First
Amendment in the Supreme Court of the United States: An Unhurried Historical Review,
53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 79, 146 (citing West Virginia State Board of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)):
54

Academic freedom plays out somewhat differently in the milieu of primary and
secondary public education. It is drawn in principally as a constitutional check
against state tendencies to misuse powers of educational command to censor
materials or instruction, but it plays out much more ambiguously and without
the same breadth of reach.
56 Cf. HANDBOOK OF CLASSROOM MANAGEMENT: RESEARCH, PRACTICE, AND
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 4 (Carolyn M. Evertson & Carol S. Weinstein, eds., 2011) (“In
other words, classroom management has two distinct purposes: It not only seeks to establish and sustain an orderly environment so students can engage in meaningful academic
learning, it also aims to enhance students’ social and moral growth.”).
57 See id. at 5.
58 Meriwether, 992 F.3d at 499.
59 See, e.g., Vega v. Miller, 273 F.3d 460, 462–63 (2d. Cir. 2001).
60 See, e.g., Bhattacharya v. SUNY Rockland Cmty. Coll., 719 F. App’x 26, 27 (2d Cir.
2017) (unpublished table decision).

2022] Academic Freedom and Misgendered Honorifics in Classrooms 1565

In this Comment, I argue that courts should consider the student’s interest in gaining access to the marketplace of ideas when
determining whether the professor or the university is able to
claim protection under the First Amendment using academic freedom. One of the justifications that the Court has given for recognizing academic freedom is that academic freedom ensures that
ideas are passed on to students.61 When individual and institutional academic freedoms conflict, courts should consider which
actor’s exercise of academic freedom promotes this goal. This idea
aligns with the principles used by the Court in its jurisprudence
on academic freedom.62 In addition, some lower courts have considered the student’s interests when evaluating academic freedom, although none have done so explicitly.63 To account for student interests, these courts have considered the impact of the
professor’s use of academic freedom on the student’s experience
in the classroom.64 Finally, the norms of professional academic
freedom—the understanding of academic freedom promulgated
by universities and professors, which is separate from the constitutional academic freedom recognized by the Court under the
First Amendment—can inform the application of constitutional
academic freedom by urging courts to consider the effects on students when evaluating exercises of academic freedom. Professional academic freedom, which prioritizes individual academic
freedom, also can supply helpful guideposts for limiting individual academic freedom in relation to student interests.
In the case of gendered honorifics, the professor’s exercise of
individual academic freedom through misgendered honorifics decreases the student’s access to the lecture content, while the university’s exercise of institutional academic freedom through its
pronoun policy protects student interests. Therefore, the university’s use of its institutional academic freedom to protect student
interests should enable it to validly infringe on the professor’s individual academic freedom by requiring the professor to cease
misgendering. For litigation purposes, a professor who was punished by a university for misgendering a student in violation of a

61

See infra Part II.B.3.
See infra Part II.B.
63 See infra Part IV.A.
64 See, e.g., Martin v. Parrish, 805 F.2d 583, 585–86 (5th Cir. 1986) (finding that a
college instructor’s use of profanity in the classroom was unprotected speech because it
lacked any academic purpose or justification and had a negative impact on students and
classroom instruction).
62
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university pronoun policy would not be able to rely on their individual academic freedom as grounds for maintaining their practice of misgendering students, because their academic freedom
would have given way to the conflicting institutional academic
freedom.
Because public-university professors are public employees,
Part I of this Comment first discusses academic freedom in the
broader context of public-employment litigation. Part II then examines the history of academic freedom and the principles behind
the doctrine, as explained by the Supreme Court. Part III explains how the misgendering of a student by a public-university
professor in contravention of a university pronoun policy should
be contextualized under the framework of academic freedom.
Part IV suggests that the proper way to evaluate whether misgendering as classroom management constitutes a protected exercise of individual academic freedom is to consider the interests
of the student as part of a balancing process between individual
academic freedom to control lecture contents and institutional academic freedom to set the university’s pedagogical goals. To do so,
this Comment invokes the Supreme Court’s principles of academic freedom, lower court decisions that consider student interests, and professional academic freedom norms.
I. FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM FOR PUBLIC
EMPLOYEES
Public-university professors are public employees. Public employees do not relinquish all First Amendment rights by virtue of
public employment, but “[w]hen a citizen enters government service, the citizen by necessity must accept certain limitations on
his or her freedom.”65
To analyze First Amendment claims brought by most public
employees, a court must first determine whether the employee is
speaking pursuant to their official duties per the test set by the
Supreme Court in Garcetti v. Ceballos.66 The Court in Garcetti
considered the case of a prosecutor who spoke up after discovering
significant misrepresentations in a search warrant affidavit.67 He

65
66
67

Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006).
547 U.S. 410 (2006).
See id. at 413–14.
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raised his concerns to his superiors, who proceeded with the prosecution anyway.68 He then faced employment actions that he felt
were in retaliation for his speech, and so he sued his supervisors,
alleging that his First Amendment rights had been violated.69 In
ruling against the prosecutor, the Garcetti Court established a
fairly bare-bones test: “[W]hen public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not
speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the
Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.”70
If the employee is not speaking pursuant to their official duties, then courts apply the Pickering-Connick framework.71 Under
the Pickering-Connick framework, courts first consider whether
the employee speaks “as a citizen upon matters of public concern.”72 If not, there is no First Amendment protection.73 If the
employee is speaking “as a citizen upon matters of public concern,” the burden shifts to the government entity to show an adequate justification for regulating the speech.74 The PickeringConnick framework was the predominant test before Garcetti.
Prior to Garcetti, this meant that if faculty members spoke on
matters of public concern and suffered adverse employment actions, they could later sue in federal court.75 After Garcetti, faculty
members must first show that they were not speaking under their
official duties before a court will examine the nature of the
speech.76 Functionally, this places more public-employee speech
beyond the reach of the First Amendment.
Public-employee speech concerning a matter of only personal
interest is not protected under the Pickering-Connick framework.77 The Supreme Court has acknowledged that the boundaries of what constitutes a “matter of public concern” are “not well

68

See id. at 414.
See id. at 415.
70 Id. at 421.
71 This framework is named after Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563
(1968), and Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
72 Connick, 461 U.S. at 147.
73 See id.
74 See id. at 147, 150.
75 See Suzanne R. Houle, Is Academic Freedom in Modern America on Its Last Legs
After Garcetti v. Ceballos?, 40 CAP. U. L. REV. 265, 274–75 (2012).
76 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421.
77 See Connick, 461 U.S. at 147; cf. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 452 (2011) (“‘[N]ot
all speech is of equal First Amendment importance,’ however, and where matters of purely
69
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defined.”78 To determine “[w]hether an employee’s speech addresses a matter of public concern,” a court must examine “the
content, form, and context of a given statement.”79 Speech deals
with a matter of public concern when it can “be fairly considered
as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to
the community.”80 In contrast, a matter of private concern would
only interest an employee personally, such as “assignments, promotion, or salary.”81 For example, a court has considered a professor’s ideas for improving the Communications Department at his
school a matter of public concern because those ideas were connected to broader proposals for the school.82 Outside of the education context, speech protesting a gay soldier’s funeral dealt with
a matter of public concern because the signs touched on issues of
“homosexuality in the military,”83 and a police officer’s refusal to
lie about a sergeant’s use of force dealt with a matter of public
concern because “[e]xposure of official misconduct . . . is generally
of great consequence to the public.”84 On the other hand, complaints by professors about the internal process used to select professors85 and objections to the closing of their laboratories86 have
been treated as “classic personnel struggle[s]” that did not implicate matters of public concern.87
After Garcetti, employee speech is much less protected by the
First Amendment. Because the Garcetti Court stated that an employee who is speaking “pursuant to their official duties” is not
speaking as a citizen, that form of employee speech no longer receives First Amendment protection under the Pickering-Connick
framework.88 If Garcetti applies, the employee’s speech is automatically excluded from First Amendment protection.

private significance are at issue, First Amendment protections are often less rigorous.”
(alteration in original) (quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988))).
78 Snyder, 562 U.S. at 452 (quoting San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83 (2004)).
79 Connick, 461 U.S. at 147–48.
80 See id. at 146.
81 Jackler v. Byrne, 658 F.3d 225, 236 (2d Cir. 2011).
82 Demers v. Austin, 746 F.3d 402, 414–17 (9th Cir. 2014).
83 See Snyder, 562 U.S. at 454.
84 See Jackler, 658 F.3d at 236.
85 Clinger v. N.M. Highlands Univ., Bd. of Regents, 215 F.3d 1162, 1166 (10th Cir.
2000) (finding no matter of public concern where a professor publicly disagreed with the
Board of Trustees “on the internal process they followed in selecting a president and reorganizing the University”).
86 Brooks v. Univ. of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 406 F.3d 476, 479–80 (7th Cir. 2005).
87 Id. at 480.
88 See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421.
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Justice David Souter dissented in Garcetti out of concern for
the effects that the “official duties” test might have on academic
freedom.89 He noted that Garcetti could impair the academic freedom of professors at “public colleges and universities, who[ ] [ ]
necessarily speak and write ‘pursuant to . . . official duties.’” 90 The
Garcetti majority explicitly acknowledged Justice Souter’s concerns. Cognizant of the potential threat to professors’ speech
within areas of their academic expertise and the chill that the
Garcetti test might have on classroom conversations about controversial ideas, the Court left open whether the Garcetti test applied to “speech related to scholarship or teaching.”91
Some circuits have held that the “scholarship or teaching”
language establishes an academic-freedom exception to Garcetti.
Instead of applying Garcetti to academic-freedom claims by public-university professors, these circuits apply the PickeringConnick framework.92
Other circuits have not yet recognized an academic-freedom
exception to Garcetti. In those circuits, much more of the professor’s speech may be unprotected as part of their official duties.93
For example, courts applying Garcetti have held that advising a
student,94 applying for academic funding,95 complaining about an
academic program,96 and maintaining classroom discipline by refusing to allow students to cheat on an exam97 were part of the
professor’s official duties and therefore unprotected by the First
Amendment.
Classroom actions related to scholarship and teaching—such
as lecturing on a controversial topic—could be considered part of
a professor’s official duties and therefore unprotected; however,
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Id. at 438 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. (quoting Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421 (majority opinion)).
91 Id. at 425.
92 See, e.g., Adams v. Trustees of Univ. of N.C.-Wilmington, 640 F.3d 550, 562–65
(4th Cir. 2011); Buchanan v. Alexander, 919 F.3d 847, 852–54 (5th Cir. 2019); Demers, 746
F.3d at 410–12.
93 See, e.g., Oren R. Griffin, Academic Freedom and Professorial Speech in the PostGarcetti World, 37 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1, 20–21 (discussing the actions of public-university
professors that would likely fall under official duties).
94 Gorum v. Sessoms, 561 F.3d 179, 185–86 (3d Cir. 2009).
95 Renken v. Gregory, 541 F.3d 769, 773–75 (7th Cir. 2008).
96 Alberti v. Carlo-Izquierdo, 548 F. App’x 625, 638–39 (1st Cir. 2013) (unpublished
table decision).
97 Bhattacharya v. SUNY Rockland Cmty. Coll., 719 F. App’x 26, 27 (2d Cir. 2017)
(unpublished table decision).
90
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no circuit has applied Garcetti to these actions thus far.98 In the
circuits that do not recognize an academic-freedom exception to
Garcetti, a court would presumably apply the Garcetti test to a
professor’s use of gendered honorifics as classroom management.
Using honorifics to call on students during lecture seems like part
of that professor’s official duties, and thus the speech would not
be protected by the First Amendment.99 By contrast, in circuits
that do recognize an academic-freedom exception to Garcetti, a
court would apply the Pickering-Connick framework to the misgendered honorifics. For example, the Meriwether court determined that misgendered honorifics implicated a matter of public
concern, citing Supreme Court precedent stating that gender
identity is a matter of “profound value and concern to the
public.” 100
Thus, the question of whether a public-university professor’s
act of misgendering is a protected exercise of academic freedom
will matter when it comes to litigating the professor’s claims under public employee First Amendment jurisprudence. In circuits
recognizing an academic-freedom exception to Garcetti, academicfreedom protections would allow the professor’s actions to be evaluated under the more employee-friendly Pickering-Connick
framework instead of the stricter Garcetti test. A professor might
still be able to claim academic-freedom protections and bypass the
Garcetti test in the circuits that do not yet recognize an academicfreedom exception, because these circuits have not yet applied the
Garcetti test to an act of scholarship or teaching. If a court did
find that an act of teaching or scholarship by a professor deserves
academic-freedom protections, it would be much more difficult for
a university to prove that disciplining the professor was lawful
under the First Amendment because the professor would be litigating under the Pickering-Connick framework. If, in contrast, an
act was not protected by the professor’s individual academic freedom, it would be much more difficult for the professor to prove
that their activity was protected because the case would be evaluated under the Garcetti test.

98 Cf. Houle, supra note 75, at 283–86 (implying that, while it is conceivable that
Garcetti could apply in such circumstances, no circuit court cases have yet broached the
issue).
99 Cf. Griffin, supra note 93, at 20–21.
100 Meriwether, 992 F.3d at 506 (quoting Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun.
Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2476 (2018)).

2022] Academic Freedom and Misgendered Honorifics in Classrooms 1571

II. ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A SPECIAL CONCERN OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT
In order to evaluate whether academic freedom should protect a professor’s use of misgendered honorifics from a university’s pronoun policy, it’s important to understand the history of
academic freedom. Created by professors and universities, professional academic freedom preceded and is separate from the constitutional academic freedom recognized by the Supreme Court
under the First Amendment. The history of constitutional academic freedom can also assist in understanding its (ill-defined)
boundaries. In Part III.A, I examine the history of professional
academic freedom. In Part III.B, I build on that history to identify
the principles of constitutional academic freedom indicated by the
Court and interpreted by lower courts.
A. The History of Professional Academic Freedom
Professional academic freedom preceded the Court’s recognition of the constitutional doctrine of academic freedom, and it can
inform our understanding of how the justices of the Supreme
Court thought about constitutional academic freedom in the first
instance. Some scholars argue that the scope of constitutional and
professional academic freedoms have semiconverged. Their suggestion is that, while constitutional and professional academic
freedoms now basically cover the same individual activities of professors, professional academic freedom doesn’t evaluate institutional academic freedom and instead focuses only on the bounds
of individual academic freedoms.101 Others argue that professional academic freedom still informs the debate but that constitutional academic freedom is narrower.102 Professional academic
freedom protects professors at private universities as well as at
public universities, while constitutional academic freedom—
which requires state action—applies only to public universities.103
Professional academic freedom has been widely accepted and has

101 Cf. Judith Areen, Government as Educator: A New Understanding of First Amendment
Protection of Academic Freedom and Governance, 97 GEO. L. J. 945, 985–88 (2009).
102 Robert J. Tepper & Craig G. White, Speak No Evil: Academic Freedom and the
Application of Garcetti v. Ceballos to Public University Faculty, 59 CATH. U. L. REV. 125,
128 (2009) (citing David M. Rabban, A Functional Analysis of “Individual” and “Institutional” Academic Freedom Under the First Amendment, 53 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 227,
237–39, 255 (1990)).
103 Rabban, supra note 102, at 237 n.31.
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informed the principles used by the Court in defining constitutional academic freedom.104
Professional academic freedom evolved to protect professors
from being disciplined due to their ideas. The American Association
of University Professors (AAUP) was concerned about outside actors, such as trustees, who would advocate for the punishment of
professors who held ideas contrary to the interests of the trustees.105 For example, economics faculty who had written on the
need to regulate monopolies might be removed per the request of
trustees who had benefited from monopolies.106 Such interference
was in sharp contrast with the German ideal of Lehrfreiheit, with
which many American professors in the early 1900s were familiar
because they had studied at German universities.107 Lehrfreiheit
was the principle that university professors should be free to explore new topics, especially those that are controversial, without
administrative rules infringing on this exercise of inquiry.108
To effect their goal of allowing more freedom for professors to
research and produce scholarship, in 1915 the AAUP signed the
General Declaration of Principles (the “1915 Declaration”).109 The
1915 Declaration established that academic freedom is the defining characteristic of universities and should be protected through
a variety of administrative safeguards, such as tenure and faculty
review rather than layperson review of academic dismissal
decisions.110
The AAUP reformulated the 1915 Declaration with the 1940
Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure (the
“1940 Statement”) in an effort to simplify its statements on academic freedom (and to remove a line stating that professors could
be removed for treason, which was an “eyesore” that had haunted
the AAUP when the House Un-American Activities Committee
began pursuing subversives).111 The 1940 Statement has been
104 Cf. id. at 237 (“[A] convincing justification for constitutional academic freedom requires a thorough comparison of general first amendment theories with nonlegal theories
of academic freedom, yielding conclusions about where these various theories do and do
not overlap.”).
105 Lawrence White, Fifty Years of Academic Freedom Jurisprudence, 36 J. COLL. &
U.L. 791, 800–04 (2010).
106 Id. at 799.
107 Id. at 796.
108 See id.
109 Id. at 801.
110 See White, supra note 105, at 801.
111 Walter P. Metzger, The 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and
Tenure, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 29–30 (1990).
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widely adopted by universities and is considered the “most influential expression of academic freedom principles to be found anywhere in the extensive literature on American higher education.”112 The 1940 Statement not only established freedom for
faculty members to teach their subjects without interference but
also encouraged faculty members to avoid introducing “controversial matter[s] which ha[ve] no relation to their subject.”113
The AAUP’s directives since the 1940 Statement have expanded to consider the role of students in academic freedom.114
The current AAUP policy statement on the academic freedom of
students emphasizes that “[f]reedom to teach and freedom to
learn are inseparable facets of academic freedom.”115 Students are
entitled to an environment “conducive to learning.”116
B. Judicial Principles of Constitutional Academic Freedom
The Supreme Court first took notice of constitutional academic freedom twelve years after the 1940 Statement in Justice
William O. Douglas’s dissenting opinion in Adler v. Board of
Education.117 The Court was considering a case brought by a professor claiming that the Feinberg Law—a state-law attempt to
root out communism by making a list of every government employee’s organizational affiliations—was unconstitutional.118
While the majority of the Court upheld the Feinberg Law, Justice
Douglas dissented, arguing that the law would “raise havoc with
academic freedom.”119 Justice Douglas stated that requiring
teachers to show their connection with a listed organization
would discourage the “pursuit of truth” and noted that “it was the
pursuit of truth which the First Amendment was designed to
protect.”120
Justice Douglas’s dissent is important not only for its groundbreaking language of academic freedom as it relates to the First

112

White, supra note 105, at 802; see Metzger, supra note 111, at 3.
Id. at 803 (quoting AAUP, 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and
Tenure, AAUP.ORG, https://perma.cc/QG2L-A3RX).
114 See, e.g., Van Alstyne, supra note 55, at 82 (describing the increasingly complex
canon of the AAUP in the years since the 1940 Statement).
115 AAUP, POLICY DOCUMENTS AND REPORTS 141 (1984).
116 Id. at 135.
117 342 U.S. 485 (1952), overruled in part by Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S.
589 (1967).
118 Id. at 486–92.
119 Id. at 509 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
120 Id. at 511.
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Amendment but also because he didn’t frame academic freedom
as “parasitic” on traditional free speech rights under the First
Amendment.121 Instead, he established it as its own independent
First Amendment concern, which would allow it to gain a “recognizable shape” within First Amendment law.122 As Professor J.
Peter Byrne notes, “[a]cademic freedom is the only First
Amendment right enjoyed solely by members of a particular profession.”123 The concept of the right to academic freedom is both
broader and narrower than the traditional right to free speech: as
part of their exercise of academic freedom, a professor could show
a movie for educational purposes that would be considered obscene (and hence unprotected) in other circumstances, but that
same professor could also be punished for teaching that gravity
doesn’t exist, a statement that may be protected speech for others.124
Following the first appearance of the term “academic freedom” in Justice Douglas’s dissent, the Supreme Court has repeatedly taken note of academic freedom.125 The arc of academicfreedom opinions parallels a broader Supreme Court trend during
this period toward increasing First Amendment protections.126
The Court has not, however, decided a case solely on the concept
of academic freedom.127 Some scholars argue that academic freedom therefore does not exist as a constitutional right.128 Others
have questioned that view by pointing out that the protection of
academic freedom is necessary because of the role of universities
and professors in seeking out truth—one of the quintessential
purposes of the First Amendment.129 Regardless of the lack of a
Supreme Court decision based solely in academic freedom, the
lower courts have used Supreme Court statements on academic
freedom to determine whether they should apply the protections
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Van Alstyne, supra note 55, at 107.
Id.
123 J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: A “Special Concern of the First Amendment”,
99 YALE L.J. 251, 264 (1989).
124 See Rabban, supra note 102, at 242.
125 Van Alstyne, supra note 55, at 107–54 (discussing changes in First Amendment
Supreme Court jurisprudence).
126 See id. at 112 (“The trend of the [academic freedom] cases [following Adler] yielded
a strengthened first amendment philosophy within the Court.”).
127 See generally Scott R. Bauries, Individual Academic Freedom: An Ordinary Concern of the First Amendment, 83 MISS. L.J. 677 (2014).
128 See generally id.; Lawrence Rosenthal, Does the First Amendment Protect Academic Freedom?, 46 J. COLL. & U.L. 51 (2021).
129 See Alan K. Chen, Bureaucracy and Distrust: Germaneness and the Paradoxes of
the Academic Freedom Doctrine, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 955, 963–64 (2006).
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of academic freedom in cases before them.130 Unfortunately, the
lack of a clear rule on the bounds of academic freedom has led to
a variety of situations where academic freedom has been applied
inconsistently: “Lacking definition or guiding principle, the doctrine floats in the law, picking up decisions as a hull does
barnacles.”131
Despite this uncertainty, the Supreme Court has used three
guiding principles when discussing constitutional academic freedom. First, individual teachers should be free to investigate and
exchange ideas without a chill or “pall of orthodoxy over the classroom.”132 Second, universities must be able to use institutional academic freedom to decide “who may teach, what may be taught,
how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.”133
Third, the core of academic freedom is its democratic value, which
requires a wide exposure of students to the “robust exchange of
ideas” to be effective.134
These judicial principles of constitutional academic freedom
may not map perfectly onto misgendering of a student as classroom management because of the nature of the disputes on which
the Court has spoken. All of the Court’s opinions concerning academic freedom have dealt with external policies, meaning policies
that impacted academic freedom but originated outside of the university environment, such as from a state legislature. Misgendering in contravention of a university pronoun policy implicates an
internal conflict between individual and institutional academic
freedoms. While that distinction will be discussed further in
Part III.A, it’s useful to understand that the principles on which
the Court relies apply specifically to the academic freedom being
considered—institutional or individual—instead of to the muddied
interactions between individual and institutional academic
freedoms.
1. A professor’s academic freedom includes the ability to
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See infra Parts II.B.1, II.B.2.
Byrne, supra note 123, at 253.
132 Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603.
133 Sweezy v. N.H., 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting
CONFERENCE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN AND THE
UNIVERSITY OF THE WITWATERSRAND, THE OPEN UNIVERSITIES IN SOUTH AFRICA 10–12
(1957) [hereinafter CAPE TOWN CONFERENCE]).
134 Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603.
131

1576

The University of Chicago Law Review

[89:1557

choose which ideas to communicate in the classroom.
The landmark case for academic freedom for professors—and
the first time that a majority opinion considered academic freedom135—is the case that overturned Adler. In Keyishian v. Board
of Regents of the University of the State of New York,136 the Court
struck down the same Feinberg Law that required professors to
disclose “subversive” organizational affiliations and was upheld
in Adler.137 Although the Keyishian Court struck down the Feinberg
Law on substantive First Amendment grounds because the law
was unconstitutionally vague and did not cite Justice Douglas’s
Adler dissent, the Court did discuss the chilling effect on teachers.138 During this discussion, the Keyishian Court affirmed the
idea that teachers should be able to inquire into new subjects in
pursuit of knowledge and should be given the freedom to communicate those ideas to the nation’s future leaders.139 The Court
emphasized that new understandings are out there to be discovered and that the more different ideas that students can be exposed to, the better.140 The Keyishian Court expanded on the plurality opinion in Sweezy v. New Hampshire141—which had
discussed the idea that teachers must always retain the space for
free inquiry142—to establish that teachers should be allowed to
pursue their scholarship and communicate it in the classroom
without a “pall of orthodoxy.”143 The Sweezy plurality evaluated
the case of a state attorney general who questioned a lecturer
about comments he made in class to determine whether those
comments contained subversive content.144 The Sweezy opinion
stated that this questioning would tread on teachers’ opportunities to practice free inquiry.145
There are other Supreme Court opinions affirming this freedom for teachers. For example, in Wieman v. Updegraff,146 the
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White, supra note 105, at 810.
385 U.S. 589 (1967).
137 Id. at 605–10.
138 Id. at 597–610.
139 Id. at 603 (first citing United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372
(S.D.N.Y. 1943), aff’d, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); and then citing Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 250).
140 See id.
141 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
142 See id. at 250.
143 Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603.
144 Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 243–44.
145 Id. at 250–52.
146 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
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Court analyzed a statute requiring an oath of loyalty for all state
employees.147 Among other things, the oath of loyalty required employees to swear that they were not members of a communist or
subversive agency.148 While the Court struck down the law on due
process grounds, Justice Felix Frankfurter, a former academic,
noted in his concurring opinion (joined by Justice Douglas, also a
former academic) that this law also implicated the academic freedom of teachers.149 Justice Frankfurter decried the use of the oath
not only because it would decrease freedom of inquiry and association but also because that inhibition would decrease the “free
spirit” of teachers to cultivate and practice open-mindedness.150
He noted that teachers needed the freedom to both inquire into
new ideas and to communicate those ideas to students.151 The
Court again recognized the importance of academic freedom in
Edwards v. Aguillard,152 in which it struck down a Louisiana law
requiring teachers to teach “[c]reationism” alongside evolution.153
There, the majority noted that the Louisiana law failed to protect
academic freedom because teachers could no longer teach science
as they chose.154
But these Supreme Court decisions do not clearly define the
boundaries of individual academic freedom. The Court neither defines “pall of orthodoxy” nor specifies how far the ability to inquire
and communicate controversial ideas should extend. None of the
Court’s opinions clearly states the answers to these questions.
Both scholars and lower courts have attempted to expand upon
and clarify this doctrine.
Scholars have attempted to build a framework for individual
academic freedom based on this patchwork of Supreme Court
opinions. Generally, scholars agree that individual academic freedom extends to the pursuit of controversial ideas—the core of the
professor’s academic freedom is the protection of critical inquiry.155 As part of that pursuit, professors should be allowed to
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155

Id. at 184–85.
Id. at 186.
Id. at 195–98 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Id. at 195.
See Wieman, 344 U.S. at 196.
482 U.S. 578 (1987).
Id. at 581, 596–97.
Id. at 587–89.
Van Alstyne, supra note 55, at 87:
A faculty, especially a research faculty, is employed professionally to test
and propose revisions in the prevailing wisdom, not to inculcate the prevailing wisdom in others, store it as monks might do, or rewrite it in elegant
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teach within their trained fields of competence without state interference with the ideas presented. Because professors are generally required to publish their work and disseminate it through
teaching, it would be counterproductive to extend protection to
the work but not to the dissemination of that same work, so teaching is also protected.156 Most scholars have bound a professor’s use
of academic freedom to the professional norms and standards of
their field: a mathematics professor may seek out controversial
ideas, but can’t escape punishment if they teach that two plus two
equals five.157
Lower courts generally seem to have embraced the principle
that professors can teach controversial ideas. For example, in
Dube v. State University of New York,158 the Second Circuit considered the case of a public-university professor who was denied
tenure allegedly because he taught that Zionism in Israel was a
form of racism.159 After a public outcry over the professor’s lecture
contents, the university took action against the professor that he
felt was retaliation for his classroom teachings.160 The court allowed the professor’s First Amendment retaliation claim to proceed, stating that it would be impermissible for the university to
defend its tenure decision on the basis of the controversy his ideas
caused.161 The reason for the court’s decision was that such retaliation would cast a “‘pall of orthodoxy’ over the free exchange of
ideas in the classroom” in violation of the professor’s First Amendment rights.162
Kerr v. Hurd163 is another example of a court applying academic freedom protection when the professor was: (1) teaching
and (2) within the professional standards of their field. There, a
medical school professor claimed that he faced retaliation because
of his advocacy for forceps delivery over cesarean sections.164 The
detail. Its function is primarily one of critical review: to check conventional
truth, to reexamine (“re-search”) what may currently be thought sound but
may be more or less unsound. Its purpose is likewise to train others to the
same critical skills.
156 Michael A. Olivas, Reflections on Professorial Academic Freedom: Second
Thoughts on the Third “Essential Freedom”, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1835, 1843–44 (1993).
157 Id. at 1844–45.
158 900 F.2d 587 (2d Cir. 1990).
159 Id. at 588–91.
160 Id.
161 Id. at 598.
162 See id. (quoting Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603).
163 694 F. Supp. 2d 817 (S.D. Ohio 2010).
164 Id. at 834.
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Kerr court noted that the expressed views were “well within the
range of accepted medical opinion” and occurred during the professor’s teaching and that those views should “certainly” have received protection under the First Amendment as part of the professor’s academic freedom.165 Because of this holding, the court
found that the claim fell within an academic-freedom exception to
Garcetti, and it analyzed Dr. Kerr’s claims under the PickeringConnick framework.166
2. A university’s academic freedom includes the ability to
set the curriculum and pursue legitimate pedagogical
interests.
Institutional academic freedom is rooted in the university’s
role as the facilitator of public education’s purpose—the robust
exchange of ideas—and in the “expansive freedoms of speech and
thought associated with the university environment.”167 The
Supreme Court has written that “universities occupy a special
niche in our constitutional tradition.”168 Universities occupy this
special niche due to their role in providing the atmosphere that is
“most conducive” to experimentation of thought.169 Institutional
academic freedom stems from the need to protect this role.170
Thus, the First Amendment covers “[t]he freedom of a university
to make its own judgment as to education.”171
The Supreme Court first recognized the idea of institutional
academic freedom after individual academic freedom for professors had been acknowledged.172 Justice Frankfurter’s concurrence
in Sweezy identified freedom to inquire as a necessary precondition for a professor’s exercise of individual academic freedom.173
To that end, Justice Frankfurter emphasized that it is the “business of a university to provide that atmosphere.”174 Since then, the
Supreme Court has recognized academic freedom of universities
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Id. at 844.
Id. at 843–44.
167 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003).
168 Id.
169 Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 263 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting CAPE TOWN
CONFERENCE, supra note 133, at 11).
170 See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312–13 (1978).
171 See id. at 312.
172 Richard H. Hiers, Institutional Academic Freedom or Autonomy Grounded upon
the First Amendment: A Jurisprudential Mirage, 30 HAMLINE L. REV. 1, 12–13 (2007).
173 Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 261–63 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
174 Id. at 263 (quoting CAPE TOWN CONFERENCE, supra note 133, at 11).
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as “educational autonomy” that is “grounded in the First
Amendment.”175 The Court’s jurisprudence centers this freedom
on the university’s right to choose “who may teach, what may be
taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to
study.”176 The Court specifically discussed a university’s academic
freedom when considering a student’s challenge to his university’s decision to dismiss him.177 The Court found institutional academic freedom relevant because the decision required an academic determination of the quality of the student’s work
product.178
The Court in Grutter v. Bollinger179 considered the university’s academic freedom when deferring to the affirmative action
admission decisions of a public university.180 The Grutter Court
reasoned that institutional academic freedom, which allowed universities to ensure the proper educational environment, included
the ability to select its own students.181 Citing language from past
academic-freedom cases like Keyishian, Wieman, and Sweezy, the
Grutter Court stated that universities have a compelling government interest in making their “own judgments as to education”
and “seek[ing] to achieve a goal that is of paramount importance
in the fulfillment of [their] mission[s].” 182 The Court has also
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Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329.
Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 263 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting CAPE TOWN
CONFERENCE, supra note 133, at 12).
177 Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 215, 225–26 (1985).
178 Id. at 226–28.
179 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
180 See id. at 311.
181 See id. at 329. The Court discussed Justice Powell’s concurrence in Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), linking student diversity and academic freedom. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329 (citations omitted) (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S.
at 312–13):
176

We have long recognized that, given the important purpose of public education
and the expansive freedoms of speech and thought associated with the university environment, universities occupy a special niche in our constitutional tradition. In announcing the principle of student body diversity as a compelling state
interest, Justice Powell invoked our cases recognizing a constitutional dimension, grounded in the First Amendment, of educational autonomy: “The freedom
of a university to make its own judgments as to education includes the selection
of its student body.” From this premise, Justice Powell reasoned that by claiming
“the right to select those students who will contribute the most to the ‘robust
exchange of ideas,’” a university “seek[s] to achieve a goal that is of paramount
importance in the fulfillment of its mission.”
182 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312, 313). The Court cited
language from past academic freedom cases to support the proposition that universities
“occupy a special niche in our constitutional tradition.” Id. (collecting cases).
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acknowledged that state restrictions on speech in public universities present “complicated First Amendment issues . . . because
government is simultaneously both speaker and regulator.”183 The
Court has noted that judges may not be equipped with the expertise and specialization required to review decisions made by universities, and so courts should defer to the university.184 According
to the Court, judges should respect “legitimate academic
decisionmaking.”185
The Supreme Court’s guidance on the boundaries of institutional academic freedom is also unclear. As the Court itself has
noted, its jurisprudence has focused on the university’s right to
be free of content-based, direct infringements on academic freedom by the government.186 Beyond acknowledging that universities do have a right to academic freedom, however, the Court has
been short on details.
Scholars have interpreted the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence as acknowledging a First Amendment academic-freedom
right for public universities that is independent from a public university’s role as an employer or a government regulator and is
instead based on its unique role as an educator.187 Institutional
academic freedom comes from, among other things, two broad
ideas. First, universities have the status, unique to their role as
educator, as the “preeminent institution[s] in our society where
knowledge and understanding are pursued with detachment or
disinterestedness”—i.e., they are charged with the search for
truth that the Court has mentioned is so important.188 Second, the
university-as-educator aspires to instill young people with
knowledge and the capacity for building good judgment.189 By
183

Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 198 n.6 (1990).
Ewing, 474 U.S. at 226–27.
185 See Univ. of Pa., 493 U.S. at 199 (emphasis in original).
186 See id. at 197–98 (differentiating the Court’s past academic-freedom cases, which
involved content-based regulations dependent on the university’s speech, from the case at
hand, which involved an “indirect” infringement on academic freedom in requiring universities to produce tenure-decision files in an employment dispute).
187 See, e.g., Areen, supra note 101, at 988–93; Byrne, supra note 123, at 300 (“To this
extent, Chief Justice Rehnquist is correct in insisting that government as educator is different from government as sovereign.”).
188 Byrne, supra note 123, at 333.
189 Id. at 333–36; see also Chen, supra note 129, at 964 (citing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329):
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Universities serve a different function than any other governmental institution
or any other governmental employer. They exist for the purpose of creating and
disseminating knowledge. They are created as institutions of both teaching and
research, which advance social interests in producing educated citizens and increasing understanding across multiple academic disciplines. . . . By protecting
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providing a place for disinterested inquiry and for students to
learn how to evaluate the world around them, the public university deserves its own institutional form of constitutional academic
freedom.190
Many lower courts have held that universities have the right
to set curricula and determine course content. Universities should
be permitted to set the course direction and grading policy and to
determine whether homework loads are appropriate for the level
of the course.191 Because they may exercise their freedom to set
curricula, universities are not required to permit a professor who
they have asked to teach chemistry to instead focus on the art of
tea making. Institutional academic freedom allows universities to
determine the knowledge and skills that they expect students
who take the course to obtain, and it permits universities to tell
instructors what topics they must cover.192
For example, in Piggee v. Carl Sandburg College,193 the Seventh
Circuit considered the case of a cosmetology professor who frequently discussed religion in the classroom and told several students that they “ha[d] the devil in [them].”194 After noting that
professors do have the right to discuss controversial ideas in class
under the academic-freedom framework, the court distinguished
the statements at issue in Piggee because they were outside of the
curriculum set by the university.195 First, the court stated that
universities have an interest in an instructor’s adherence to the
subject matter that they were hired to teach.196 Second, the court
noted that universities should be able to discipline a professor
whose actions interfere with the school’s educational mission.197
The court came to this conclusion after noting that one student
said they avoided the professor because of her actions.198 The court

and encouraging a diversity of viewpoints and perspectives, universities enhance the search for truth. Indeed, the process of that search is desirable from a
societal perspective, even if the truth is never, or cannot ever be, attained. If
academic freedom protection belongs in the Constitution, it belongs nowhere else
than the First Amendment.
190

See Byrne, supra note 123, at 338.
Lovelace v. Se. Mass. Univ., 793 F.2d 419, 425–26 (1st Cir. 1986).
192 James D. Gordon III, Individual and Institutional Academic Freedom at Religious
Colleges and Universities, 30 J. COLL. & U.L. 1, 7–8 (2003).
193 464 F.3d 667 (7th Cir. 2006).
194 See id. at 672.
195 Id. at 671–72.
196 Id. at 671.
197 See id. at 671–72.
198 Piggee, 464 F.3d at 672.
191
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therefore found that the professor’s actions had inhibited her ability to perform her job by undermining her relationship with her
students.199
In another case dealing with religion, the Eleventh Circuit in
Bishop v. Aronov200 evaluated a physiology professor who frequently discussed religion in class and held “optional classes” discussing a Christian perspective on physiology.201 The university
affirmed its commitment to the professor’s academic freedom but
requested that he refrain from bringing up his religion during
class time and asked him to stop any optional religion-based classes connected to the course.202 The court upheld this restriction as
part of the university’s prerogative not only to regulate the curriculum but also to exercise some authority over the conduct of
teachers that bears significantly on the delivery of the
curriculum.203
Both Piggee and Bishop involved incidents that happened
during class time. Courts might previously have placed classroom
instruction exclusively within the domain of the professor’s academic freedom to control the content of lectures. Instead, while
neither Piggee nor Bishop held that institutional academic freedom categorically overrides individual, the courts were clear that
the university can control classroom time in a way that contravenes the professor’s wishes without running afoul of the First
Amendment.

3. Students have an interest in free access to the
“marketplace of ideas.”
The Supreme Court has never recognized a right to academic
freedom for students.204 Yet, as Professor Walter Metzger has
noted, leaving students out of the analysis would mean that “a
major part of the constitutional story of academic freedom would
go untold.”205

199

Id. at 671–72.
926 F.2d 1066 (11th Cir. 1991).
201 Id. at 1068–69.
202 Id. at 1069.
203 Id. at 1074–77.
204 See Byrne, supra note 123, at 262–63.
205 Walter P. Metzger, Profession and Constitution: Two Definitions of Academic Freedom in America, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1265, 1304–05 (1988).
200
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The Supreme Court has continuously emphasized that one
effect of protecting academic freedom is the promotion of democratic values in students. The Keyishian Court noted that the
“Nation’s future” depends on giving future leaders “wide exposure
to th[e] robust exchange of ideas.”206 In Sweezy, the Court stated
that “[t]eachers and students must always remain free to inquire,
to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding;
otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die.”207 In Barenblatt v.
United States,208 the Court claimed that “learning-freedom,”
which was a corollary to “academic teaching-freedom,” was so essential to the “well-being of the Nation” that the Court would “always be on the alert against intrusion . . . into this constitutionally protected domain.”209 Finally, the Court in Baggett v. Bullitt210
considered a claim brought by both students and faculty that a
state statute requiring a loyalty oath infringed on their academic
freedom.211 The Court declined to rule on whether students had
standing to bring the suit, noting that “the interests of the students at the University in academic freedom are fully protected
by a judgment in favor of the teaching personnel.”212 These cases
demonstrate that academic freedom is not protected in a vacuum;
instead, it is partially important because of its effects on students.
The cases do not recognize an academic-freedom right for students, however.
Scholars generally follow the Court’s analysis by not recognizing a student right to academic freedom. Byrne argues that
none of the free speech rights that are currently recognized for
students represent an affirmative right for students to exercise
academic freedom because the rights don’t concern scholarship or
learning.213 Instead, student speech rights represent general civil
rights, and cases on students’ rights enforce students’ civil rights
against schools, rather than protecting academic work and values.214 Notably, much of the scholarship on students’ academicfreedom rights comes from students themselves, who have argued
for the consideration of student interests with regard to identity
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214

Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603.
Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 250 (emphasis added).
360 U.S. 109 (1959).
Id. at 112.
377 U.S. 360 (1964).
Id. at 361–66.
Id. at 366 n.5.
Byrne, supra note 123, at 262–63.
Id.
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issues in the university context. One student note argued that
student interests should be used to consider whether a professor
can be punished for their out-of-classroom racist speech due to
concerns about discrimination in grading, self-esteem issues, and
impeding student performance.215 Another student note considered
cases involving sexual harassment in the classroom and suggested that some weight should be given to the student’s right to
a learning environment free from sexual harassment.216
Lower courts have not explicitly described student interests
as an element of academic freedom. However, some courts have
considered student access to the marketplace of ideas when deciding conflicts between university and professorial academic
freedoms, as discussed below in Part III.A.
III. CONTEXTUALIZING THE USE OF GENDERED HONORIFICS
WITHIN ACADEMIC FREEDOM
As noted above, the term “classroom-management devices” is
a blanket term for classroom activities that help facilitate the
learning process but that are not directly related to the content of
the lecture.217 There are contexts other than misgendering where
classroom-management devices may cause conflicts between professors and universities. For example, a university may object to
a seemingly low-value classroom-management device, such as a
sports-based peer-approval system.218 A professor may allow a
brainstorming exercise that turns “pornographic” to continue to
the dismay of university officials.219 Thus, the question of how to
evaluate classroom-management devices under the academicfreedom framework is potentially significant for many aspects of
a professor’s behavior in the classroom.
A professor’s use of a classroom-management device in contravention of university policy implicates several different
academic-freedom considerations. First, the university policy is
an internal rule because it’s promulgated by the university, unlike an externally promulgated rule from the legislature. As noted
above, past Supreme Court cases concerning academic freedom

215 Donna Prokop, Note, Controversial Teacher Speech: Striking A Balance Between
First Amendment Rights and Educational Interests, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2533, 2568–77 (1993).
216 See generally, Lisa M. Woodward, Comment, Collision in the Classroom: Is Academic Freedom a License for Sexual Harassment?, 27 CAP. U. L. REV. 667 (1999).
217 See supra Introduction.
218 See, e.g., Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 910 F.2d 1172, 1174–75 (3d Cir. 1990).
219 See, e.g., Vega v. Miller, 273 F.3d 460, 470 (2d. Cir. 2001).
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all dealt with external rules. Second, because classroommanagement devices can impact the professor’s delivery of their
ideas and the curriculum set by the university, there is conflict
between the professor’s academic freedom to communicate their
ideas and the university’s academic freedom to set how subjects
may be taught. These conflicts help contextualize why misgendering in a case like Meriwether is not easily addressed by established academic-freedom concepts.
A. Pronoun Policies as Internal Disputes Between Institutional
and Individual Academic Freedoms
“Academic freedom thrives not only on the independent and
uninhibited exchange of ideas among teachers and students, but
also, and somewhat inconsistently, on autonomous decisionmaking
by the academy itself.”220 The pronoun-policy dispute at issue in
Meriwether implicates both the university’s institutional and the
professor’s individual academic freedoms.
All of the Supreme Court’s academic-freedom jurisprudence
has involved external disputes.221 An external dispute involves a
rule originating from outside the university system that is promulgated by an actor that does not possess their own academic freedom. The Court’s cases thus far analyzed an infringing action
from non-university governmental bodies, like legislatures222 or
agencies.223 The government actor had done something to either
the university or the professor, and the university or professor
had claimed that their academic freedom had been infringed as a
result. For instance, the Feinberg Law in Keyishian allowed the
New York State Board of Regents, rather than individual universities, to promulgate rules and collect lists of alleged subversive
violators, and schools did not retain discretion over whether the
violating employees were fired.224 Sweezy involved questioning by
the Attorney General to discover whether subversive activities
had taken place in the classroom.225

220 Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 226 n.12 (1985) (citations omitted) (first citing Keyishian, 385 U.S., at 603; then citing Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 250, 263; and
then citing Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978)).
221 White, supra note 105, at 827.
222 See, e.g., Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 593–94.
223 See Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 198 (1990).
224 385 U.S. at 591–99.
225 354 U.S. at 236–37, 243–45.
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By contrast, pronoun policies that are promulgated by the
university and used against a professor are entirely internal. Because these policies sometimes implicate Title IX concerns—as illustrated by Ms. Doe’s Title IX complaint in Meriwether—the dispute may seem external. However, unlike the laws implicated in
the early Supreme Court cases, which operated as rules on the
individual universities and employees,226 neither Title IX nor the
documents interpreting it explicitly tell universities the way that
they must act to avoid litigation. Instead, they act more as standards, allowing universities to determine the best way to meet antidiscrimination requirements, whether through prophylactic
rules, disciplinary procedures, or both.227
The Supreme Court has not spoken on internal disputes
about academic freedom and on whether they should be evaluated
differently than external disputes.228 Therefore, I am assuming
that the principles used by the Supreme Court to evaluate external conflicts are equally applicable to internal conflicts. This is
because the judicial principles that set out why universities and
professors have academic freedom229 are all functionally intrinsic
to the interest at stake that must be protected, not to the actor
causing the freedom to be called into question. For instance, the
professor has the individual academic freedom to communicate
ideas without a chill or “pall of orthodoxy.” That goal doesn’t depend on whether the infringing force is internal or external—the
chill would result from either the university’s or the legislature’s
restrictive action. The same idea applies to the institutional academic freedom to determine the curriculum. The value comes
from the university’s role in facilitating the critical exchange of
ideas, and so a university can act to prevent disruption to this
important mission, regardless of where the threat to that mission
originates.230
226 See, e.g., White, supra note 105, at 804–12 (describing how the laws involved in
early academic-freedom cases typically involved laws or state action, which resulted in the
termination of employment).
227 See, e.g., Ronna Greff Schneider, Sexual Harassment and Higher Education, 65
TEX. L. REV. 525, 545 (1987) (noting that Title IX’s procedural requirements are intended
as a “preemptive strike against harassing behavior”); Christopher J. Roederer, Free
Speech on the Law School Campus: Is it the Hammer or the Wrecking Ball that Speaks?,
15 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 26, 53–57 (2018) (discussing freedom of speech conflicts from universities promulgating policies in excess of explicit Title IX requirements to avoid Title IX
litigation).
228 White, supra note 105, at 827.
229 See supra Part II.B.
230 See Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 262–63 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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Because the Supreme Court has not yet heard a case where
institutional and individual academic freedoms conflict, it is difficult to determine from the Court’s jurisprudence alone how to
weigh individual academic freedom against institutional academic freedom.231 Circuit courts have recognized this difficulty
and have split on whether they (1) recognize a rule that institutional academic freedom overrules individual academic freedom
within the classroom, (2) recognize a rule that individual academic freedom overrules institutional academic freedom within
the classroom, or (3) conduct a case-by-case balancing of the two
freedoms whenever there is a conflict. The following discussion
considers each of these frameworks in turn.
Some of the lower courts have explicitly determined that, in
the classroom, institutional academic freedom controls. For instance, in Edwards v. California University of Pennsylvania,232
the Third Circuit held that a public-university professor did not
have a First Amendment right to choose curriculum materials in
contravention of the university’s dictates; that right fell within
institutional academic freedom.233 The Seventh Circuit in Piggee
held that the university had primacy in setting its own educational mission, and so the instructor’s frequent religious discussions in the classroom, which infringed on that mission, were not
protected by her academic freedom.234
By contrast, the Sixth Circuit in Meriwether held that in the
classroom the professor’s academic freedom controls while the
professor is teaching, regardless of whether the professor’s speech
is germane to the content of the lecture.235 The Meriwether court
explicitly upheld this protection against the university’s argu-

231

See White, supra note 105, at 827.
156 F.3d 488 (3d Cir. 1998).
233 Id. at 491.
234 464 F.3d at 671–72.
235 See Meriwether, 992 F.3d at 507 (“Thus, the academic-freedom exception to
Garcetti covers all classroom speech related to matters of public concern, whether that
speech is germane to the contents of the lecture or not.”). There may be a question as to
whether this unduly infringes on the university’s academic freedom and so should be considered wrongly decided. The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Meriwether does not clearly fall
outside of the principles set out by the Court, however. The Meriwether court did not say
that a professor could go against any restriction set by the university as long as the professor was in the classroom. See id. at 507 (“Of course, some classroom speech falls outside
the exception: A university might, for example, require teachers to call roll at the start of
class, and that type of non-ideological ministerial task would not be protected by the First
Amendment.”).
232
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ment that academic freedom belongs to public universities instead of professors. The court stated that professors have “‘First
Amendment rights when teaching’ that they may assert against
the university.”236
Other circuits balance these interests on a case-by-case basis,
frequently putting the onus on the university to prove a legitimate interest in order to justify the infringement on the professor’s academic freedom. For example, the Second Circuit in
Levin v. Harleston237 considered the case of a professor who was
punished for his out-of-classroom comments denigrating the “intelligence and social characteristics” of Black people.238 The Levin
court held that the professor could be punished only if the university showed that the harm to the university’s educational mission
outweighed the infringement on the professor’s First Amendment
rights.239 The Second Circuit has also upheld the right of a university to require teaching demonstrations and “place parameters on
scholarship” if the university can show relation to a legitimate
university interest.240 The Eleventh Circuit has similarly held
that courts should consider the strength of the university’s interest when evaluating a restriction on individual academic freedom.
For instance, in Bishop, the court upheld a university’s ability to
impose reasonable restrictions inside the classroom because a
university has a strong interest in the classroom conduct of its
professors.241 Thus, courts sometimes do evaluate whether the
claim to institutional academic freedom is sufficiently strong to
overcome the exercise of individual academic freedom.
B. Misgendered Honorifics as an Exercise of Academic
Freedom(s)
The use of misgendered honorifics to manage classroom discussion falls between the two poles of classroom academic freedom: (1) the professor’s individual right to communicate their
area of scholastic expertise and (2) the university’s institutional
right to determine how subjects will be taught.
Professors have a clear right to communicate controversial
ideas as long as those ideas are part of their academic expertise
236
237
238
239
240
241

Id. at 507 (quoting Hardy v. Jefferson Cmty. Coll., 260 F.3d 671, 680 (6th Cir. 2001)).
966 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1992).
Id. at 87.
See id. at 88.
Bruce Comm. v. Yen, 764 F. App’x 68, 69 (2d Cir. 2019) (unpublished table decision).
See Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1076.
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and fit within the curricula assigned by their universities.
Classroom-management devices can fit within the concept of the
professor’s academic freedom because classroom management
can impact the communication of a lecture.242 For example, we
might find a state law mandating the use of the Socratic Method
and prohibiting lecturing to be problematic for a professor who is
trying to teach a complex class, such as differential equations,
where students need lecture in order to get their feet wet on most
concepts.
Effective classroom management is unique to both the
teacher and the makeup of each class.243 Effective classroom
management decreases disruptions to lecture and improves student outcomes.244 Because a lack of classroom management can
mean that classroom time is spent on discipline rather than on
lecturing, it seems likely that courts would find that rules that
allow no flexibility for classroom management would impermissibly restrict the academic freedom of a lecturer to communicate
their ideas. Some speech is equally clearly part of the university’s
academic freedom—setting grading policies, setting the bounds of
the curriculum, etc.
Classroom management also relates to course administration. Because professors are public employees, it can be difficult
to separate the university’s interest in effective classroom
management originating from the university’s role as an educator
from the interest in classroom management emanating from the
university’s role as an employer. Professors are unique among
public employees because of individual academic freedom, which
they can wield against their employer to get more leeway in the
classroom.245 Therefore, even though classroom management

242 See Donal M. Sacken, Taking Teaching Seriously: Institutional and Individual Dilemmas, 61 J. HIGHER EDUC. 548, 550 n.2 (1990) (“Although the core issue for academic
freedom is undoubtedly content oriented, others have accepted the notion that how a subject is taught is cognizable under the academic freedom rubric.” (emphasis in original)
(citing STEVEN G. OLSWANG & BARBARA A. LEE, ASS’N FOR THE STUDY OF HIGHER EDUC.,
FACULTY FREEDOMS AND INSTITUTIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY: INTERACTIONS AND CONFLICTS
26–28 (1984))).
243 HUE MING-TAK & LI WAI-SHING, CLASSROOM MANAGEMENT 9–12 (2008).
244 See Margaret C. Wang, Geneva D. Haertel, & Herbert J. Walberg, Toward a
Knowledge Base for School Learning, 63 REV. EDUC. RSCH. 249, 277–78 (1993); Mareike
Kunter, Jürgen Baumert & Olaf Köller, Effective Classroom Management and the Development of Subject-Related Interest, 17 LEARNING & INSTRUCTION 494, 500–07.
245 See Rabban, supra note 102, at 242 (“The requirement of scholarly independence
for the proper performance of academic work entitles the professor to more freedom from
employer control than enjoyed by the typical employee.”).
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could fall under institutional academic freedom alone, I also consider it under individual academic freedom because the role of the
university as employer does not automatically override the professor’s exercise of academic freedom.246
Meriwether claimed that the use of honorifics was solely
within his right to academic freedom, not the university’s, because he used the honorifics as a classroom-management device
to encourage respectful communication.247 As noted above,
classroom-management choices also fit within the university’s
right to determine how subjects will be taught.
Meriwether also claimed that his use of gendered honorifics
to misgender Ms. Doe—essentially, his use of misgendered honorifics—was part of his academic-freedom right to communicate
controversial ideas.248 Meriwether lectured about gender identity
in other portions of his class, and the university action at issue in
Meriwether was not directed to his lectures about gender identity.249 Importing a controversial idea into a classroommanagement device does not automatically transform that idea
into part of the lecture contents. The honorifics were instead focused on managing the classroom discussion to ensure that it was
“respect[ful]” and sufficiently “weighty.”250 Thus, the use of misgendered honorifics, even to communicate an idea, should not automatically fall solely under the professor’s individual academic
freedom, which traditionally would have covered lecturing. The
controversial idea he intended to communicate was secondary to
his purpose of managing the classroom discussion. Therefore, it
should be analyzed as a classroom-management device.
Lower courts are not clear about how to evaluate teaching
language that is not part of a subject-matter lecture but still occurs within the classroom. For instance, the Fifth Circuit held
that a university could punish a professor who used profanity
while seeking to “motivate” his students.251 In addition, the Second
Circuit has held that nonscholastic speech in the classroom that
relates to classroom management is not a part of the professor’s
246

See id. at 242–43.
See Meriwether, 992 F.3d at 499.
248 See id. at 502.
249 See id. at 502, 506. Note that Meriwether did say that he avoided lecturing further
on gender identity issues because he was concerned that the university would investigate
him again. However, the cause of the principal investigation was the misgendering of Ms.
Doe, not an issue with lecture materials. Id.
250 Meriwether, 992 F.3d at 499.
251 Martin v. Parrish, 805 F.2d 583, 585 (5th Cir. 1986).
247
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academic freedom.252 The court applied this rule to classroom discipline by a professor, holding that under Garcetti, classroom discipline was one of the quintessential “official duties” of the professor and did not fall into the traditional framework of a professor’s
academic freedom.253 Unlike the Second Circuit, the Sixth Circuit
held in Meriwether that a classroom-management technique can
be considered part of a professor’s academic freedom as a component of the professor’s speech in the classroom, regardless of
whether the speech was related to the content of the lecture.254
The Meriwether court rejected an attempt by the university to categorize honorifics as simply “ministerial.”255
In summary, misgendering of a student by a public-university
professor in contravention of a university pronoun policy creates
a conflict between individual and institutional academic freedoms. The action does not fall totally under one concept of academic freedom—it does not solely involve the professor lecturing
on a controversial topic, which would be the professor’s individual
academic freedom, and it does not fall solely under administration
of a course, which would be the university’s institutional academic freedom.
IV. STUDENT INTERESTS SHOULD INFORM ANALYSIS ON USE OF
CLASSROOM-MANAGEMENT DEVICES AS A FACET OF ACADEMIC
FREEDOM
As noted above, classroom-management devices do not
squarely fall on either side of the academic-freedom conflict.
While they help facilitate the exchange of ideas, they are not
simply a communication of a professor’s ideas and so do not fully
qualify as an exercise of individual academic freedom. On the
other hand, they are not purely ministerial in the way that setting
a curriculum, requiring roll call, or administering classroom discipline would be. In addition, appropriate classroom management
enhances the goals of both individual academic freedom, which
facilitates dissemination of ideas, and institutional academic free-

252 Bhattacharya v. SUNY Rockland Cmty. Coll., 719 F. App’x 26, 27 (2d Cir. 2017)
(unpublished table decision).
253 Id.
254 Meriwether, 992 F.3d at 507.
255 Id. (“[T]he academic-freedom exception to Garcetti covers all classroom speech related to matters of public concern, whether that speech is germane to the contents of the
lecture or not.”).
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dom, which facilitates its mission of educating students. “Effective classroom management has been shown to increase student
engagement, decrease disruptive behaviors, and enhance use of
instructional time, all of which results in improved student
achievement.”256
I argue that courts should explicitly consider the student’s
interest when evaluating cases where individual and institutional academic freedoms conflict during use of classroommanagement devices. When a court is determining which exercise
of academic freedom, institutional or individual, should override
the other during a conflict involving a student, the court should
give additional weight to whichever exercise of academic freedom
better enhances the student’s interest for three reasons. First,
this type of balancing would expand upon the Supreme Court’s
principle that academic freedom exists in part to increase student
access to ideas because it would explicitly consider the student’s
interest when determining which party can claim protection
through academic freedom. Second, it would align with the decisions of some lower courts that have considered the student perspective when evaluating the conflict between individual and institutional academic freedoms. Finally, it would comport with
norms of professional academic freedom, which consider the interests of the student when evaluating the use of individual academic freedom and can provide guidance to help judges determine
when the student’s interests should be used.
A. Courts Should Explicitly Consider Students’ Interests when
Academic Freedoms Conflict
As noted above, the Supreme Court has considered the value
of student access to the marketplace of ideas when discussing academic freedom.257 The interest of the student can add additional
weight to individual academic freedom or institutional academic
freedom when the two are in conflict, depending on which exercise
better protects the student’s interest. For instance, a professor
should be able to decide that the Socratic method is the best way
for students to learn the lecture contents. Because the Socratic
method has not been demonstrated to inhibit the access of students to the lecture contents, this should be protected as an exercise of individual academic freedom. Therefore, the university
256
257

Wang, Haertel & Walberg, supra note 244, at 262.
See supra Part II.B.3.
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should not be permitted to demand that a professor cease using
the Socratic method because there is no reason for institutional
academic freedom to override the individual’s academic freedom.
However, if a professor determined that female students did not
provide good answers to questions unrelated to childbearing, that
professor should not be able to decline to ask or answer any questions of a female student in violation of a university policy that
prohibited differential treatment under Title IX. Such a denial
would infringe on the female student’s access to the content of the
lecture. Under my theory of balancing, in this situation the pendulum would swing in favor of the university regulating the professor, because the university rules would increase female students’ access to the marketplace of ideas.
This would also address the hypothetical posed by the
Meriwether court: What if a university promulgated a policy stating that professors were never permitted to use pronouns that
matched the student’s gender identity if those pronouns didn’t
match the pronouns assigned at birth?258 In that case, the professor’s exercise of academic freedom to use properly gendered honorifics would increase student access to the content of the lecture,
and the professor would be able to utilize their academic freedom
in opposition of the university’s rule requiring misgendering.
While lower courts have not done the sort of explicit balancing of student interest that I am recommending, they have occasionally had opportunities to assess professors’ use of classroommanagement devices under the framework of academic freedom.
Even though courts have not explicitly stated that they are balancing the interests of the students, they appear to recognize that
a professor’s expression can affect the student’s ability to exchange ideas and have allowed this to influence their decisions.
For example, in Martin v. Parrish,259 the Fifth Circuit considered a professor who would “motivate” his students by complaining about their attitude and cursing while doing so.260 After student complaints and several warnings by administrators,
258 Meriwether, 992 F.3d at 506. While this would be illegal under the current interpretation of sex discrimination under Title IX, see Title IX in Light of Bostock, supra
note 26, at 32,638, the Trump administration promulgated no such interpretation immediately after Bostock. Bostock’s holding was limited to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. See generally Bostock, 140 S. Ct. 1731. Further rules by the Biden administration
applied this interpretation of sex discrimination to Title IX. See Title IX in Light of Bostock,
supra note 26, at 32,639.
259 805 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1986).
260 Id. at 585.
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Professor J.D. Martin’s employment was terminated.261 He
brought a lawsuit claiming deprivation of his First Amendment
rights.262 At trial, he argued that his speech was protected under
the First Amendment as part of his right to academic freedom.263
The Fifth Circuit rejected his claims.264 The court held that
Martin’s speech had no educational function, and the court therefore did not decide how far the right to academic freedom should
extend.265 As part of the decision, the court commented that Martin’s
behavior “degrade[d]” the educational mission of the university
and “detract[ed] from the subjects he [was] trying to teach.”266 According to the Martin court, the goals of higher education are to
instill democratic values and nurture the pursuit of knowledge.267
The Fifth Circuit noted that the college had introduced evidence
showing that his behavior hindered instruction and that students
had “lost interest” in economics and feared asking questions in
class.268 Because his behavior had hindered his effectiveness as a
teacher by decreasing the access of students to the class, the court
held that the college’s discipline of Martin was appropriate and
did not offend First Amendment public-employee principles.269
The Martin court was essentially protecting the exercise of institutional academic freedom that served to decrease the adverse effects on students in the professor’s class.
Another example is Carley v. Arizona Board of Regents,270 a
case dealing with a professor who would leave the classroom frequently during class time because he thought that it would help
students be more “self-reliant.”271 Professor Denny Carley stated
that his teaching methods should have been protected under his
individual academic freedom.272 The university pointed to student
evaluations that were explicitly critical of Carley’s teaching methods

261

Id. at 584.
Id.
263 Id.
264 Martin, 805 F.2d at 585–86.
265 Id. at 585–86 (finding that Martin’s language had “no academic purpose or
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to justify its decision not to rehire Carley.273 The Carley court upheld the use of student evaluations as a tool to determine whether
the professor’s teaching methods were infringing on the university’s institutional academic-freedom rights to determine how to
educate students.274 While doing so, the court expressly noted that
the university declined to rehire Carley not because of his expression of unpopular opinions or controversial ideas but instead because “he was not an effective teacher.”275 Thus, the Carley court
noted that the students’ access to the lecture not only could be
considered by the university without infringing on the professor’s
academic freedom but was also helpful for deciding whether to
place the university’s academic freedom over the professor’s.
Consider also Piggee, the Seventh Circuit case discussing the
professor who told a student that they had “the devil in [them].”276
The Piggee court evaluated whether the professor’s exercise of academic freedom was curtailing the university’s pedagogical
goals.277 The court mentioned that the instructor’s speech actually
inhibited her ability to do her job because it undermined her relationship with students who were offended by her religious
speech.278
The consideration of students’ experiences when evaluating
the exercise of a professor’s academic freedom is therefore not unprecedented. No court has explicitly weighed the student interest
as a component of its analysis when considering an academicfreedom conflict. The test I propose would bring the student interest to the forefront and require courts to consider it as part of
their analysis of a conflict between institutional and individual
academic freedom. This balancing, as noted above, would have led
the Meriwether court to uphold the university’s right to discipline
Meriwether for contravening the university’s pronoun policy.
B. Applying Constitutional Academic Freedom Principles to
Misgendered Honorifics as a Classroom-Management
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Device
A professor’s ability to disseminate controversial ideas within
their subject of expertise is clearly protected by individual academic freedom under the principles set out by the Supreme Court,
which prioritize freedom of critical inquiry for professors.279 Universities have institutional academic freedom to ensure that their
professors are furthering the pedagogical environment at the
school, which advances the principles protecting the university as
an educator of the nation’s future leaders.280 The use of misgendered honorifics brings those two academic freedoms into conflict because it is a classroom-management device co-opted for the
secondary purpose of conveying an idea. In the Meriwether case,
the classroom-management device was used to disproportionally
impact a single student because of her gender identity.281
Meriwether allegedly used gendered honorifics as a “pedagogical tool” in class for two primary reasons.282 First, he believed
that addressing students as “Mr.” or “Ms.” helped students “view
the academic enterprise as a serious, weighty endeavor.”283 Second, he believed it “foster[ed] an atmosphere of seriousness and
mutual respect.”284 The Sixth Circuit noted that choices about how
to lead the classroom discussion can ultimately shape the content
of the instruction.285
Misgendering has been shown to interfere with the misgendered student’s experience in the classroom relative to other
students in the classroom who are properly gendered. For instance, even awareness of other students’ interactions with gender prejudice can negatively impact a particular gendernonconforming student’s feelings of ease and belonging on campus.286 As noted above, misgendering a student can lead to an increased chance of a negative academic outcome, something that
is expressly against the goals of a university.287 Therefore, using
misgendered honorifics can actually serve to undercut the point
279
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of using honorifics in the first place: rather than creating a respectful environment, the misgendered student feels actively
disrespected.
For example, Meriwether’s acts of misgendering negatively
impacted Ms. Doe. While the Meriwether court mentioned that
Meriwether gave Ms. Doe a high grade and that he thought that
she participated in class discussions,288 this trivialized the harm—
a common problem with misgendering.289 The harm was not trivial: it was significant enough for Ms. Doe to complain. Ms. Doe, in
her motion to intervene, stated that she dreaded participating in
Meriwether’s class because of the misgendering but felt that she
had to because Meriwether graded on the basis of class participation.290 In addition, Ms. Doe stated that “[b]eing singled out and
treated disrespectfully [ ] caused Ms. Doe significant psychological strain and distress, including an increase in both the severity
and duration of her gender dysphoria.”291
Misgendering is also part of a broader social context that denigrates the lived experiences of transgender people. Misgendering
is seen as a type of “dishonorific,” communicating “disrespect, disfavor, or inferiority” and demeaning a person rather than addressing them.292 The act of misgendering is a practice similar to
the use and lack of use of honorifics to convey social subordination
of marginalized groups.293
Given the broader negative effects on transgender students
that arise from using the wrong gender honorifics to identify
them, efforts by universities to ensure use of the proper gendered
pronouns should be protected under institutional academic freedom. This would ensure that students do not have their academic
experiences negatively impacted by misgendering. Misgendering
is similar to the situation the Martin court addressed, where the
professor’s actions were clearly negatively impacting the students, and so the Martin court prioritized the university’s exercise of academic freedom to create a pedagogical environment.294
A professor’s use of their academic freedom to misgender a
student under the guise of classroom management interferes with
288
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the student’s access to the marketplace of ideas; the use of a pronoun policy as part of the university’s academic freedom to determine how subjects may be taught does not. Therefore, in this dispute between institutional and individual academic freedom, the
student’s interest weighs against the protection of misgendering
for classroom management as an exercise of a professor’s individual academic freedom. Here, institutional academic freedom
should override the individual’s academic freedom.
There are limits to this balance—activities that are very
clearly protected by a professor’s or a university’s academic freedom do not need to be balanced. For instance, a professor’s lecture
about sex assigned at birth would clearly be a protected exercise
of their individual academic freedom so long as it fell within the
curriculum prescribed by the university (for instance, in a gender
studies class and not calculus). That would not be a case tied to
increasing student participation.
The idea that misgendering a student has no place in a
classroom-management device is rooted in two principles of academic freedom. First, universities have an institutional academic
freedom that does cover some aspects of a professor’s communications in class. Second, students have an interest in accessing the
intended fruits of the use of academic freedom: a robust marketplace of ideas. To put it another way, a professor can’t spend a
chemistry-teaching period speaking only about the best way to
weave a basket underwater. Similarly, a professor shouldn’t be
able to co-opt classroom management, a component of instruction
that falls between individual and institutional academic freedom,
in a way that diminishes a student’s access to the marketplace of
ideas. Under this theory, the opposite is also true for a university’s exercise of academic freedom. A university can’t tell a professor not to speak about the most cutting-edge research in their
chemistry-teaching period when that is the professor’s area of expertise. Similarly, a university can’t require a professor to misgender and decrease the effectiveness of the professor’s communication of their ideas. Because both the university and the
professor should be aligned in increasing access of the student to
the content of the lecture, an actor that does not do so and thus
creates a conflict of academic freedoms cannot claim that their
exercise of academic freedom overrides.
Balancing toward the student in Meriwether would still have
led to an outcome consistent with the principles of academic freedom for all parties. Meriwether would still be permitted to teach
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his own thoughts about gender identity—the pronoun policy does
not cast a “pall of orthodoxy” over his lecture of his ideas in the
classroom. Instead, the pronoun policy impacts his use of gendered honorifics during classroom management, a choice he could
change and still communicate his ideas through the lecture (for
example, calling every student “colleague” to still retain a respectful environment). As part of institutional academic freedom, the
university had allowed the professor to lecture on his ideas about
gender identity but had also required the professor to only refer
to students by their chosen pronouns. The first protected the professor’s academic freedom to disseminate his controversial ideas,
and the second protected the students’ and universities’ interests
in an environment that was conducive to learning for transgender
students. Under this framework, Meriwether would not have
been permitted to claim that misgendering was an exercise of his
academic freedom.
C. Utilizing Professional Academic Freedom to Understand
Misgendered Honorifics as Classroom Management
As explained in Part II.A, the 1940 Statement, which has
been widely adopted by colleges and universities around the country, has helped to develop well-defined bounds for the norms of
professional academic freedom.295 Later policy statements updating the 1940 Statement have introduced some ideas regarding
where students fit into the exercise of professional academic freedom.296 The members of the AAUP are largely considered experts
on professional academic freedom, and the bounds they set, which
are mostly concerned with the professor’s academic freedom,297
help define how to consider the student’s interests in accessing
the content of the lecture along with the professor’s ability to
teach the lecture.
1. The AAUP’s policy statements indicate that a student’s
interests should be considered when a professor

295 See Edward J. Graham, New Endorsers of the 1940 Statement, AAUP.ORG (2014),
https://perma.cc/DHZ2-U8HM.
296 See generally AAUP, supra note 115.
297 Metzger, supra note 205, at 1272.
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exercises their academic freedom.
The AAUP’s 1915 Declaration and 1940 Statement were primarily intended to establish the academic-freedom rights of professors.298 They have since been updated with policy statements
from the AAUP that expressly consider the interests of
students.299
The AAUP’s publications contemplate that exercises of professional academic freedom should consider the effects on students. A professor should encourage “the free pursuit of learning
in [their] students.”300 Faculty members should be cognizant of the
inherent authority they possess in the instructional role; students
“should not be forced by th[is] authority . . . to make particular
personal choices as to . . . [their] own part in society.”301 As teachers, faculty members are expected to show respect for each student “as an individual” during exercises of professional academic
freedom.302 Even under the AAUP’s (expansive) conception of academic freedom, the AAUP recognizes that in some circumstances
the university may curtail the professor’s individual academic
freedom to ensure that the student is able to access the learning
environment fully—the AAUP’s policy statements clearly state
that professional academic freedom does not protect purposeful
misgendering.303 While academic freedom protects potentially uncomfortable conversations about sexuality and gender, misgendering does not “demonstrate respect for students as individuals,”
which the AAUP also considers an important facet of professional
academic freedom.304
Meriwether, by misgendering Ms. Doe, did not consider the
effects that his speech would have on her in the way that the
AAUP’s policy statements intended. Misgendering by a professor
requires the student to (1) either bow to the professor’s authority
and accept the professor’s erasure of the student’s gender identity
or (2) resist and not experience the full range of the academic experience. The AAUP’s policy statements clearly decline to view
either of these options as positive outcomes of academic freedom.
298 See White, supra note 105, at 801–04 (describing provisions of the AAUP’s 1915
Declaration and 1940 Statement).
299 AAUP, supra note 115, at 141.
300 Id. at 133.
301 Id. at 135.
302 Id. at 133.
303 On Academic Freedom and Transphobia, AAUP.ORG (Nov. 22, 2021),
https://perma.cc/DM5S-HSLV.
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2. Norms of professional academic freedom recognize the
difference between respecting a student’s identity and
respecting a student’s ideas.
Norms of professional academic freedom draw a clear line:
while professors do not have to respect a student’s ideas, they
must respect the student as a person.305 The “pedagogical purpose
of higher education [is] to introduce critical distance between students and their own ideas,” essentially to develop the students’
ability to distinguish a critique of their identity and personhood
from a critique of their ideas.306 A professor’s use of academic freedom for classroom speech should not involve offensive speech that
is functionally harassment directed at specific students.307
To prevent individual academic freedom from being swallowed by the subjective sensitivities of students, courts can use
professional norms to evaluate academic freedom.308 Professional
academic freedom is only protected when it stays within professional norms.309 Professional standards suggest that an instructor
who accidentally misgenders a student should “acknowledge the
misgendering, apologize, and move on.”310 The purpose of this exercise is to send a “message of respect” without dwelling on the
misgendering and calling attention to the student.311
Meriwether was entitled to lecture about his beliefs on gender identity. It could have been a valid use of his academic freedom for him to argue with Ms. Doe about her ideas on gender
identity during his lecture on the subject. By using those ideas to
treat Ms. Doe differently because of her gender identity, however,
Meriwether crossed the line from idea to person and violated
norms of professional academic freedom. Respecting a person’s
gender identity is core to respecting that person. The consideration of the student’s interest would ensure that professors cannot
point to academic freedom to justify actions that disrespect people.
CONCLUSION
Misgendering of a student can have significant harms on a
transgender student’s access to the educational environment.
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While the Supreme Court has been clear that both individual and
institutional academic freedoms should be protected, the Court
has not explained how these freedoms should be balanced when
they are in conflict. I submit that the proper way to assess
classroom-management devices is to defer to whichever exercise
of academic freedom, either individual or institutional, preserves
the student’s interest in accessing the learning environment.
Consideration of the student’s interest in accessing the marketplace of ideas is supported by the Supreme Court’s First
Amendment jurisprudence, the lower courts’ use of the student
experience in assessing the strength of academic-freedom claims,
and professional norms of academic freedom. All of these contemplate a base environment where the student is able to fully participate in the exchange of ideas when universities and professors
exercise their academic freedom.

